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Abstract
In a two-country model with habit formation, we focus on interdependent
macroeconomic adjustments to global and country-specific income shocks.
Global habits and habit differentials play key roles in the global equilibrium
dynamics, possibly nonmonotonic, and in the determination of international
asset distribution. A country’s steady-state holdings of net external assets
rely on (i) weighted income difference in excess of habit differentials and (ii)
global income in excess of global habits. Local income shocks have greater
effects on the international asset distribution than global income shocks.
With habit formation, positive income shocks lower the world interest rate,
thereby harming the creditor country and benefitting the debtor country due
to the intertemporal terms-of-trade effect. In contrast to the case of trade
theory, this intertemporal immiserizing growth effect is more likely to be
caused by global income shocks than by country-specific income shocks.
JEL Classification Numbers: F41, D90.
Keywords: Global habits, habit differentials, immiserizing growth, two
country model, global shock, country-specific shock.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to focus on habit formation as a key factor that
determines macroeconomic adjustments of an interdependent world economy.
In doing so, we describe two-country equilibrium dynamics in terms of the
evolution of global consumption habits and international habit di¤erentials.
When consumers in both countries are rationally habit forming, the two
countriespropensities to consume depend on their individual habits. The
global habits, dened as the sum of individual countrieshabits, determine
the aggregate preference for present goods, and hence decide the world
equilibrium interest rate. The habit di¤erentials between the two countries
determine the di¤erence in the consumption propensities and hence a¤ect the
dynamics of the international asset distribution. The novelty of this paper
is to work out international interactions that these two forces produce.
We tackle three important issues: (i) the determinants of the equilibrium
external asset holdings, (ii) the di¤erences in the e¤ects of global and local
income shocks, and (iii) the welfare implications of habit-driven macroeco-
nomic adjustments. We show that a countrys net foreign assets depend
on habit di¤erentials and global habits. In particular, in steady state, a
countrys net external asset holdings rely on weighted income di¤erence in
excess of habit di¤erentials and global income in excess of global habits. One
important implication is that local income shocks have greater e¤ects than
global income shocks on the international income di¤erential and hence on
the international asset distribution.
With habit formation, positive income shocks lower the world interest
rate, thereby harming the creditor country and benetting the debtor coun-
try due to the intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect. This is an intertemporal
version of the immiserizing growth e¤ect developed by, e.g., Bhagwati (1958)
and Brecher and Bhagwati (1982). We show that this intertemporal immis-
erizing growth e¤ect is more likely to be caused by global income shocks
than by country-specic income shocks. This result contrasts to the case of
trade theory: in trade theory, positive supply shocks commonly occurring in
the individual countriesexporting sectors have smaller e¤ects on the static
terms of trade than positive supply shocks occurring locally in one of the two
countries. In our dynamic context, when a positive income shock is global,
the relative magnitudes of the harmful intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect
to the direct benecial income e¤ect is larger than they would be when the
shock is country-specic.
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The analytical model employs the two-county framework developed by
Gombi and Ikeda (2003) and Ikeda and Gombi (2009). Those papers were
concerned with the e¤ects of scal policies under preference heterogeneity in
habit formation, where the role of global habits in dynamic adjustment were
assumed away by setting the initial holdings of net foreign assets to be zero.
By assuming homogeneous preferences, the present research focuses on inter-
actions among global habits, habit di¤erentials, and the consumption/saving
dynamics, and thereby examining their implications for international asset
distribution and the adjustments to global and local income shocks.1
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we
present a two-country model and examine equilibrium dynamics of consump-
tion, the interest rate, and net foreign assets. In Section 3, we analyze the
e¤ects of local and global income shocks on the economy and each countries
welfare. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Two-Country Model
2.1 The basic framework
Consider a two-country world economy composed of home and foreign coun-
tries. Each country is populated with innitely lived agents with homoge-
neous preferences. The representative agents in home and foreign countries
are referred to as consumers H and F, respectively. They consume a single
type of consumption goods and hold wealth in the form of bonds. Both goods
and bonds are assumed to be costlessly traded in international markets. For
brevity, the representative agents H and F are assumed to be endowed with
constant amounts of output y and y, respectively. Throughout the paper,
the foreign countrys variables are represented with superscript asterisks.
Consumption forms habits. Letting z()t represent the time-t habit, we
specify z()t as the average of the past consumption rates c
()
s ; s 5 t: z()t =
1For small country models with habit formation, see, e.g., Mansoorian (1993a, b) and
Ikeda and Gombi (1999). Gruber (2002) provides empirical support to an intertemporal
current account model with habit formation. The literature concerning two-country
dynamic models includes Devereux and Shi (1991), Ikeda and Ono (1991), Bianconi and
Turnovsky (1997), and Bianconi (2003).
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R t
 1 c
()
s exp (  (t  s)) ds; or equivalently
_z
()
t = 

c
()
t   z()t

; (1)
where _x represents the time derivative of variable x and  represents the
discount rate for past consumption rates. We assume that consumers in both
countries have the common discount rate  for past consumption rates. This
enables us to obtain the tractable dynamics of a two-country equilibrium.
Consumers H and F are assumed to have the same lifetime utility function
specied as
U
()
0 =
Z 1
0
u(c
()
t ; z
()
t ) exp ( t)dt; (2)
where  represents the subjective discount rate. To ensure the steady state,
the discount rate is the same in the two countries.
We focus on the typical e¤ect of habit formation in a simple way by
specifying the felicity function as
u

c
()
t ; z
()
t

=

c
()
t   z()t
1 '
1  ' ; (3)
where the habit parameter  2 (0; 1) captures the strength of habit inuence;
and ' represents a risk aversion parameter.2
With this felicity function, consumer preferences display adjacent com-
plementarity, wherein an increase in todays habits increases the marginal
utility of todays consumption more than it increases marginal disutility of
habits, thereby, ceteris paribus, enlarging todays optimal consumption. To
be formal, Ryder and Heal (1973) dene adjacent complementarity as the
felicity function satisfying ucz (c; c) + +2uzz (c; c) > 0: To capture the in-
tertemporal complementarity, dene 
 as    ucz + +2uzz =ucc. Then, with
the felicity function (3), the index 
 can be computed as

 = 

1  
2+ 

> 0; (4)
2The felicity function satises the regularity conditions proposed by the Ryder and
Heal (1973). The same felicity function is assumed by, e.g., Constantinides (1990) and
Gruber (2004).
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which implies that consumer preferences in the two countries commonly dis-
play adjacent complementarity.3
Let bt denote net foreign assets held by consumer H. The ow budget
constraint for consumer H is given by
_bt = rtbt + y   ct: (5)
Given the initial values (b0; z0) and the (perfectly predicted) time prole of
the market interest rate frtg1t=0; consumer H chooses C0 = fct; bt; ztg1t=0 so
as to maximize (2) subject to: (i) the ow budget constraint (5); (ii) the
formation of consumption habits (1); and (iii) the transversality conditions.
Letting t (= 0) be the shadow price of savings and t(5 0) that of habit
formation, the optimal conditions are given by
uc (ct; zt) = t   t; (6)
_t = (   rt)t; (7)
_t = ( + ) t   uz (ct; zt) ; (8)
where uc (c; z) = (ct   zt) ' and uz (ct; zt) =   (ct   zt) ', together with
(1), (5), and the transversality conditions for bt and zt: Consumer Fs behav-
ior can be specied in exactly the same way.
We assume away any role of the governments. The model is closed by
introducing the market clearing conditions:
ct + c

t = Y ( y + y) ; (9)
bt + b

t = 0; (10)
where Y represents the aggregate income. ByWalraslaw, these are not inde-
pendent: (10) together with (5) and the corresponding constraint for the for-
eign consumer imply (9). In sum, the equilibrium time path of (bt; bt ; ct; c

t ; zt;
zt ; rt; t; 

t ; t; 

t ) is determined by equations (1), (5) through (8), the corre-
sponding equations for F, and the market equilibrium condition (9) or (10).
3Even if the risk aversion parameter ' di¤ers between the both countries, the relation,

H = 
F = 
 = 

1  2+

> 0, is retained. The discussions in this section, therefore,
can be extended without substantial changes to the heterogenous risk aversion cases.
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2.2 Equilibrium dynamics
In this economy consumption dynamics in the two countries interact through
international market transactions. It is useful to dene global habit Zt as
Zt  zt + zt : (11)
Since  is assumed to be common to the two countries, the dynamics of Zt
can be expressed from (1) and the market clearing condition (9) as
_Zt =  (Y   Zt) : (12)
If Zt and zt are given, zt are determined from (11).
As in Ikeda and Gombi (2009), dynamics can be drastically simplied in
the following manner. Dene  as:
 =


;
which is constant over time since _t=t = _

t=

t from (7) (and the corre-
sponding equation for F). We then construct aggregate indices for (u; u)
and (; ) as:
v (c; z; Z)  u (c; z) + u (Y   c; Z   z) ; (13)
&     ; (14)
where (9) and (11) are substituted.
As shown in Appendix A, we can reduce the equilibrium dynamics of
consumption habits around a steady-state point as follows:
0@ _z_&
_Z
1A =
0B@  

1 + vcz
vcc

  2
vcc
 vcz
vcc
(vcz)
2 vccvzz
vcc
 + (vcc+vcz)
vcc
vczvcz+vccvzz
vcc
0 0  
1CA
0@ zt   z& t   &
Zt   Z
1A ;
(15)
where x denotes a steady-state value of variable x: Dynamic system (15) has
two stable roots:
! 
  
q
( + 2)2   4 ( + 2) 

2
(< 0) and   ; (16)
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and one unstable root, which is conjugate with !; and 
 is given by (4).
From the assumed property of adjacent complementarity, it can be shown
that ! +  > 0.
As shown in Appendix B.1, the saddle plane governed by the two stable
roots are expressed as
_z = ! (zt   z)  (! + )(1  )
 
Zt   Z

; (17)
_Z =    Zt   Z ; (18)
where
  ucc
ucc + ucc
:
By equating (17) to (1), the consumption dynamics are given by
ct   c =

! + 


(zt   z)  (1  )
 
Zt   Z

: (19)
Di¤erentiate this by t and substitute (1), (18), and (19) successively into
the result. Then, by taking (9) into account, we obtain the motion of each
countrys consumption as
_c = ! (ct   c) ; (20)
_c = ! (ct   c) : (21)
Irrespective of the second-order habit dynamics of (17) and (18), therefore,
the equilibrium consumption dynamics are of the rst order. Equations (1)
and (20) jointly govern the equilibrium dynamics of (c; z); and equations (1)
and (21) do dynamics of (c; z).
As is proven by Appendix B.2, the interest rate dynamics are given by
rt    = 

 
Zt   Z

; (22)
where  is dened as     uccucc
ucc+ucc
(> 0) ; implying that Zt plays a crucial
role. Suppose that Zt > Z. Then, due to adjacent complementarity, i.e., 
 >
0, ceteris paribus there prevails excess demand in the present good market.
This renders r higher than its steady-state value . The equilibrium interest
rate positively (negatively) comoves with the aggregate habit stock, which
exhibits monotonic motions with stable root   (see (18)). The resulting
dynamics of r are given explicitly by
_r =   (rt   ) : (23)
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The transition dynamics of net foreign assets also depend on the prop-
erty of the world felicity function and international heterogeneity in habit
formation. As shown by Appendix B.3, by linearizing (5) and substituting
(19) and (22) into the result, we can obtain
bt   b = ! + 
 (   !) (zt   z) 

(1  ) (! + )
 (   !) +
b0

 + 
 
Zt   Z

: (24)
Two habit stocks zt and Zt a¤ect bt by changing consumption and the
interest rate. An increase in the habit stocks raises consumption from (19),
which should be nanced by net foreign assets greater than its steady-state
level. This e¤ect is expressed by the terms without b0 in (24). An increase
in the aggregate habit stock raises the interest rate by (22). The resulting
rise in interest income alters the time prole of net foreign assets. The e¤ect
is captured by the terms associated with b0 in (24).
In sum, the autonomous dynamics of (17) and (18) generate the evolution
of two habit stocks zt and Zt. Given the values of the two state variables,
consumption rates ct and ct , the interest rate rt, and net foreign asset bt
are determined by (19), (22), and (24), respectively. The dynamics can be
described more simply by introducing the weighted di¤erence of the two
countrieshabit stocks:
et = zt   (1  ) zt : (25)
We refer to et as weighted habit di¤erentials between countries H and F,
or simply habit di¤erentials. The equilibrium net foreign assets (24) can be
rewritten as
bt   b = ! + 
 (   !) (et   e) 
b0

 + 
 
Zt   Z

; (26)
which implies the following results.
Proposition 1: Country Hs net foreign assets bt depend on habit di¤eren-
tials et and global habits Zt in the following manners:
(i) bt is larger as et is larger; and
(ii) bt is larger as Zt is smaller (larger) if country H is the net creditor
(debtor), b0 > (<)0.
With a habit di¤erential, the corresponding optimal consumption level
is high relatively to the other countrys, so that net foreign assets should
7
be large enough to sustain it, as in (i) of Proposition 1. The e¤ect of global
habits is due to the interest rate adjustment. With adjacent complementarity,
a large Zt implies a large demand for present goods and hence a high interest
rate. The resulting interest revenue induces country H to accumulate net
foreign assets toward the long-run higher level. Equilibrium b thus negatively
relates to global habits Z, and (ii) follows.
By di¤erentiating (25) and (26), and substituting (11), (17), (18), (25),
and (26) into the results, the equilibrium dynamic interactions of net foreign
assets and habit di¤erentials can be summarized as the autonomous system
of net foreign assets and habit di¤erentials:
_b =    bt   b+ (! + )2
 (   !) (et   e) ; (27)
_e = ! (et   e) : (28)
The phase diagram of (e; b) plane is depicted in Figure 1, where the _b = 0
schedule is positively sloping and _e = 0 schedule is in parallel to the vertical
axis.
As seen from (19) and (25), it is also noteworthy that the associated
consumption dynamics are generated by
ct   c =

! + 


(et   e) : (29)
To obtain the welfare level of country H, linearize instantaneous utilities
u (ct; zt) around a steady state and substitute the result into the lifetime
utility function (2) to obtain
U0 =
Z 1
0
fu (c; z) + uc (ct   c) + uz (zt   z)g exp ( t) dt:
After substituting (29) into the above equation, substitute solutions to (17),
(18), and (28) into the result. In this way, the lifetime utilities are obtained
as
U0 =
u (z; z)

+
(! + )uc + uz
 (   !) (z0   z) (30)
  (! + ) (1  )
( + ) (   !) [( + )uc + uz] (Z0   Y ) ;
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Figure 1. Equilibrium dynamics for relative habits and net foreign assets 
e
．
 = 0 
b
．
 = 0 
e  
b  
U0 =
u (z; z)

+
(! + )uc + u

z
 (   !) (z

0   z) (31)
  (! + ) 
( + ) (   !) [( + )u

c + u

z] (Z0   Y ) ;
2.3 Steady state
From (1), (5), (7), and (24), the steady-state equilibrium, (c; c; z; z; Z;b;b; r),
is determined by:
c = z; c = z; (32)
c+ c = Y = Z; (33)
e = z   (1  ) z (34)
r = ; (35)
rb+ y = c; (36)
b  b0 = ! + 
 (   !) (z   z0) 

(1  ) (! + )
 (   !) +
b0

 + 
 
Z   Z0

;(37)
b =  b: (38)
where (37) comes from (24) evaluated at t = 0.
The steady state equilibrium conditions can be reduced to:
CC 0: b  b0 = ! + 
 (   !) (e  e0) 
b0

 + 
(Y   Z0) ; (39)
DD0: b = e+ (1  )Y   y; (40)
where the CC 0 schedule is obtained by evaluating (26) at t = 0; and DD0
schedule is obtained by substituting (32) through (35) into (36). Figure 2
illustrates the two schedules, where scheduleDD0 is always steeper than CC 0.
As shown by Figure 2, the steady-state equilibrium point
 
e;b

is given
by the intersection point E of the two schedules. Given this,
 
c; c; z; z; Z

is determined by (32), (33) and (34); and b by (38).
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Figure 2. Steady state equilibrium 
b  
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C 
C’ 
E
b 
e 
D’
e
From linearity of (39) and (40), we can examine the determinants of the
long-run external asset distribution by solving the two equations for b as
b =   ! + 
! ( + )
(y   e0)  

 + 
b0 (Y   Z0) ; (41)
where y represents the weighted di¤erence of y and y:
y = y   (1  ) y:
This implies that country Hs net foreign assets are determined as in Propo-
sition 2:
Proposition 2: Country Hs steady-state holdings of external assets b are
larger as:
1. weighted income di¤erence in excess of relative depth of habits, y  e0,
is larger and;
2. global income in excess of global habits, Y  Z0 is smaller (resp. larger)
when b0 > 0 (resp. b0 < 0).
To understand the rst property, suppose that income di¤erentials y
exceeds habit di¤erentials e0, y  e0. Then, with adjacent complementarity,
ceteris paribus country H saves the excess income and thereby holds positive
external assets in the long run. We refer to this e¤ect as the relative surplus-
income e¤ect. The second property represents the interest rate e¤ect: a
large global income in excess of global habits, Y   Z0, implies a low interest
rate, and when country H is a creditor b0 > 0, Hs interest rate income also
decreases thereby suppressing the long-term asset holdings. This e¤ect is
called the interest rate e¤ect.
2.4 Income shocks
We consider global and local income shocks by xing constant the magnitude
of the resulting increase dY in the aggregate output Y .4 Let us dene the
two kinds of income shocks as follows:
4This is just a simplifying assumption that eases comparison of the e¤ects of global and
local income shocks. Even when we instead assume that increases in country Hs output
y are the same between the two shocks, and that, for local income shocks total output
increase dY equals dy, and for global income shocks dY equals dy=", our main results
below do not change.
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 global income shocks: dy = "dY and dy = (1  ") dY;
 local income shocks in country H: dy = dY and dy = 0,
where " denotes the proposition of the associated shock dy to country H in
the total shock dY .
The e¤ects of the global and local income shocks on country Hs steady-
state holdings of external assets b can be compared easily by using Proposi-
tion 2. Note rst that the interest rate e¤ect, captured by the second term of
(41), is the same for the global and local shocks. The relative surplus income
e¤ect, i.e., the rst term of (41), is larger in the case of local income shocks
than in the case of global shocks because the local income shock has larger
e¤ect on income di¤erence between the two countries than the global shock.
The following corollary thus obtains:
Corollary 1: Local income shocks have greater e¤ects than global income
shocks on country Hs steady-state holdings of external assets b in the sense
that:
db
dY

local shock
>
db
dY

global shock
:
3 Local and Global Income Shocks
Let us consider the e¤ects of positive local and global income shocks, dY > 0,
in order. Before discussing each shock, note that the e¤ect on the interest
rate does not depend on whether the shock is local or global. This is because,
by construction, the magnitudes of the resulting increase dY in the aggregate
output are the same between the two income shocks. Indeed, di¤erentiating
(22) and (33) by Y yields
dr (0)
dY

local shock
=
dr (0)
dY

global shock
=  
 < 0: (42)
This implies that an increase in Y lowers r (0). With adjacent comple-
mentarity, the positive income shock, local or global, produces excess supply
in the time-zero good market, and hence lowers the equilibrium interest rate.
After the initial response, the interest rate then monotonically converges
toward  as seen from (22).
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3.1 Local income shocks
We consider rst the e¤ects of a positive local income shock, dy = dY > 0
and dy = 0. For simplicity, let us assume that b0 > 0 without further
notice. From (32) through (38), we obtain the steady-state e¤ect on each of 
c; c; e;b

as in the second column of Table 1. They all are composed of the
direct income e¤ects, captured by the terms without b0, and the interest rate
e¤ects, represented by the terms with b0. Without the interest rate e¤ect, as
in the small country case (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi, 1999), the positive income
shock in country H increases savings, promotes interim asset accumulation
through current account surplus, and thereby increases c, e, and b while
decreasing b and c. The direct income e¤ects represent these inuences.
The interest rate e¤ects, caused by a fall in the interim market interest rate,
represent the countervailing negative income e¤ects on c, e, and b under a
positive b0, and positive e¤ects on b and c. Net e¤ects of the two have
ambiguous signs.
Figure 3 illustrates the typical adjustment of the economy in the (e; b)
and (e; c) plains. The local income shock shifts downward the CC 0 and
DD0 schedules dened by (39) and (40) from C0C 00 to C1C
0
1 and D0D
0
0 to
DLD
0
L, respectively, and thereby bringing the steady-state point from E0 to
EL, where the case in which b and e both increase is depicted. The interim
dynamics generated by (27) and (28) are illustrated as the arrowed path
from E0 to EL. Note that from a close look at Figure 1, the b dynamics can
be nonmonotonic: Country H can initially run the current account decit,
and sooner or later it turns to surplus so as to generate a greater b. The
associated consumption dynamics are shown in the (e; c) plain, where the
case in which c increases from c0 to cL is depicted. After c jumps from F0 up
to FL01 instantaneously responding to the shock, it gradually rises up to FL
along the saddle trajectory (29).
The welfare e¤ects of the local income shock, dU/dY and dU/dY shown
in column (1) of Table 1, are obtained by di¤erentiating (30) and (31) by
Y . Two properties are noteworthy: First, the positive local income shock
harms country H if and only if 1 < 
b0=( + ). This represents the
intertemporal version of immiserizing growth e¤ect that the associated fall
in the interest rate, i.e., a deterioration in the intertemporal terms-of-trade
for creditor country H, harms it, irrespective of the direct benecial e¤ect of
the income increase. Second, this interest rate fall in turn denitely benets
neighbor debtor country F.
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 Figure 3. Adjustment Processes 
0b  
DG 
C1 
DL
C’1 
D0 
C0 
C’0 
D’L D’G
FG01
FG 
FL 
FL01
F0
EG 
E0
EL 
b 
e 
c 
D’0
Lb  
Gb  
Ge  Le  0e
Gc  
0c  
Lc  
Proposition 3 (the immiserizing growth e¤ect of local income shocks):
Suppose that country H is creditor b0 > 0 (resp. debtor b0 < 0). Then, due
to the intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ects, a positive local income shock in
country H, (dy; dy) = (dY; 0) ;
1. reduces (resp. enhances) the countrys own welfare if and only if

+ 

b0 >
1; and
2. denitely benets (resp. harms) country F.
3.2 Global income shocks
Let us next consider a positive global income shock, dy = "dY and dy =
(1  ") dY , where the magnitude dY is the same as in the previous subsec-
tion. The steady-state e¤ect on
 
c; c; e;b

is shown in the third column of
Table 1. As in the local shock case, the e¤ects comprise the direct income
e¤ects of domestic and foreign income increases, represented by the terms
without b0, and the interest rate e¤ects, captured by the terms with b0. The
interest rate e¤ects are the same as in the local shock case. In contrast,
the direct income e¤ects are smaller for country Hs variables
 
c; e;b; U

and
larger for country Fs (c; U) than those in the local shock case. This is rstly
because the associated increase in y is smaller under the global income shock,
secondly because foreign income increase dy causes a negative crowding-out
e¤ect on c. As shown in the fourth column in the table, therefore the total
e¤ects are smaller for country Hs variables
 
c; e;b; U

and larger for country
Fs (c; U).
Figure 3 depicts the typical dynamic adjustment to the global income
shock. The global income shock shifts the CC 0 schedule downward by the
same amount as in the local shock case, i.e., from C0C 00 to C1C
0
1, whereas the
direction of the shift of the DD0 schedule depends on the relative magnitudes
of " and 1  (see (40)). Figure 3 illustrates a typical case in which " is smaller
than 1  , so that the DD0 schedule shift upward from D0D00 to DGD0G with
the steady-state points
 
e;b

moving downward from points E0 to EG. The
interim time path is indicated by arrows.5 The corresponding consumption
dynamics in the (e; c) plain are illustrated as the instantaneous downward
5Although Figure 3 illustrates the transition dynamics of b are monotonic, they can be
nonmonotinic under certain parameter values.
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jump from F0 to FG01, followed by over-time decreases along the saddle path
toward FG.
The welfare e¤ects of the global income shock, dU/dY and dU/dY shown
in column (2) of Table 1, can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4 (the immiserizing growth e¤ect of global income
shocks): Suppose that country H is creditor b0 > 0 (resp. debtor b0 < 0).
Then, due to intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ects, a positive global income
shock, (dy; dy) = ("dY; (1  ") dY ) ;
1. reduces (resp. enhances) the countrys own welfare if and only if

+ 

b0 >
"; and
2. denitely benets (resp. harms) country F.
Note that the global income shock is more likely to cause the intertem-
poral immiserizing growth e¤ect than the local income shock does, because
compared to the local shock case, the direct income e¤ect (positive) is small
relatively to the intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect (negative). Indeed, com-
paring Propositions 3 and 4 implies the following corollary since " < 1.
Corollary 2: Intertemporal immiserizing growth e¤ects more likely take
place due to global income shocks than due to local income shocks.
Remark 1: The result in the above corollary contrasts to that in the case of
static trade theory. In the typical static two-country trade model, where each
country specializes production in its export goods industry, global income
shocks that commonly occur in the export sectors of the two countries have
smaller e¤ects on the terms of trade, i.e., relative prices of two exporting
goods, than local income shocks of the same magnitude do, and hence are less
likely to cause immiserizing growth e¤ects. In the present dynamic setting
the changes in the intertemporal term of trade, i.e., the interest rate, are the
same under global and local income shocks of the same magnitude, dY . Due
to the direct income e¤ects, global income shocks thus have greater e¤ects
on the two countrieswelfare levels than local income shocks.6
6This reasoning is based on the simplifying assumption that increases in total output
Y are the same between global and local income shocks. Corollary 2 holds valid even
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4 Conclusions
In a two-country model with habit formation, we focus on interdependent
macroeconomic adjustments by considering global and country-specic in-
come shocks on each country. The global habits and habit di¤erentials play
key roles in the global economic dynamics, possibly nonmonotonic, and in the
determination of international asset distribution. A countrys net external
asset holdings rely on weighted income di¤erence in excess of habit di¤er-
entials and global income in excess of global habits. With habit formation,
positive income shocks lower the world interest rate, thereby harming the
creditor country and benetting the debtor country due to the intertemporal
terms-of-trade e¤ect. In contrast to the case of trade theory, this intertempo-
ral immiserizing growth is more likely to be brought about by global income
shocks than by country-specic income shocks.
For future research, two issues may be interesting. First, when a gov-
ernment can utilize the immiserizing growth e¤ect by means of scal instru-
ments, international strategic interactions would arise. It should be exam-
ined how the policy game changes our results. Secondly, extending empirical
study on habit formation to the interdependent world economy model would
be fruitful.
when we instead assume that increases in country Hs output y are the same between the
two shocks, and that, for local income shocks total output increase dY equals dy, and for
global income shocks dY equals dy=". In that case, global income shocks have a larger
intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect than local income shocks, which results in Corollary 2
again. The point is that when a positive income shock is global, the relative magnitudes
of the harmful intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect to the benecial direct income e¤ect is
larger than they would be when the shock is country-specic.
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Appendices
A Deriving the Dynamic System (15)
Note rst that = is constant because _t=t = _

t=

t from (7). By elim-
inating c and z using (9) and (11) from the foreign counterpart of (6),
combining the resulting equation and (6) yields:
uc (c; z) + 
uc (Y   c; Z   z) + 
=


= constant.
By totally di¤erentiating this equation, we obtain:
c^ =  
ucz + ucz
ucc + ucc
z^   

ucc + ucc
^ +

ucc + ucc
^

+
ucz
ucc + ucc
Z^:
We substitute this equation into (1), (8), and the foreign counterpart of
(8) and eliminate c and z using (9) and (11) from the resulting equation.
Then, from (12), the autonomous dynamic equation system with respect to
z^; ^; ^

; Z^

is obtained as follows:
_z =  

ucz + ucz
ucc + ucc
+ 1

z^   
2
ucc + ucc
^ +
2
ucc + ucc
^

+
ucz
ucc + ucc
Z^;
_ =

ucz (
ucz + ucz)
ucc + ucc
  uzz

z^ +

 + +
ucz

ucc + ucc

^
  ucz
ucc + ucc
^
   uczu

cz
ucc + ucc
Z^; (43)
_

=  

ucz (
ucz + ucz)
ucc + ucc
  uzz

z^   u

cz

ucc + ucc
^
+

 + +
ucz

ucc + ucc

^

+

u2cz
ucc + ucc
  uzz

Z^;
_Z =  Z^:
From the denitions (13) and (14) of v and &, respectively, this autonomous
system reduces to (15).
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B Equilibrium Solutions
B.1 Dynamics of habit capital z: (17)
The stable roots of dynamics (15) are given by ! and   as in (16). Letting
m denote (z; &; Z)0, the general solution to (15) can thus be expressed as
m^ (t) = A1 exp (!t) q + A2 exp ( t)h;
where q  (q1; q2; q3)0 and h  (h1; h2; h3)0 represent the eigen vectors as-
sociated with stable roots ! and  , respectively. From (15), it is easy to
conrm that q3 = 0. By eliminating A1 exp (!t) and A2 exp ( t) from the
three equations in the above vector equation, we obtain
&^ =
q2
q1
z^ +
q1h2   q2h1
q1h3
Z^; (44)
where the coe¢ cients of z^ and Z^ can be obtained by exploiting the denition
of the eigenvectors q and h as
q2
q1
=  (! + ) vcc + vcz
2
;
q1h2   q2h1
q1h3
=   vcc (vczvZZ + vcZvzz)
vccvzz + (2+ ) vccvcz
+
f(! + ) vcc + vczg fvccvZZ   (2+ ) vccvcZg
2 (vccvzz + (2+ ) vccvcz)
:
Substituting (44) into the _z-equation in (15) yields (17).
B.2 The interest rate
From (1) and (6) through (8), the optimal consumption dynamics are given
by
_c =   
ucc

r^   ^

;
where  represents the rate of time preference,
^ =
 (uzz + uzc)

z^    (+ )

^:
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Substitute (20) into the above Euler equation. The resulting equation can
be solved for r^ as
r^ =  !ucc

c^+
 (uzz + ucz)

z^    (+ )

^: (45)
In the above, ^ can be obtained from (14),(18), (43), and (44) as
^ =   ucc

H
 +   ! c^+
uzz
 + 2
z^: (46)
Substituting (46) and (19) successively into (45) yields (22).
B.3 Net foreign assets
Set
b^ = {1z^ + {2Z^: (47)
Di¤erentiating (47) with respect to time t yields
_b = {1 _z + {2 _Z: (48)
Since _b is given by (5), this equation implies
_b =

r^b0 + rb^  c^ = {1 _z + {2 _Z: (49)
Substitute (17), (18), (19), (22), and (47) into (49). By comparing the coef-
cients of the resulting equation, we obtain
(!   r){1 = a1b0   ! + 

;
  (! + ) (1  ){1   (r + ){2 = a2b0 +

! + 


(1  ) :
This simultaneous equation can be solved for {1 and {2 as
{1 =
1
r   !

! + 

  b0a1

; (50)
{2 =  (1  ) (! + )
 (r   !)  
b0
r + 

(1  ) (! + )
(r   !) a1 + a2

: (51)
Substituting (50) and (51) into (47) yields (24).
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